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LIFE'S SACRED VALUE - COMMON 
GROUND OR BATILEGROUND? 
Alexander Morgan Capron* 
LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANA-
SIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. By Ronald Dworkin. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf. 1993. Pp. 273. $23. 
Reading Ronald Dworkin's1 ambitious and fascinating attempt to 
find a middle way out of the increasingly heated public battles over the 
legal regulation of abortion and euthanasia,2 I found myself thinking 
- for reasons that I trust will presently become apparent - of an 
automobile accident a little more than a decade ago. That accident 
threw a young woman named Nancy Beth Cruzan into a ditch where 
rescue workers found her unconscious. After restoring her vital func-
tions, they took her to a nearby hospital, where doctors further stabi-
lized her condition and eventually transferred her to a state 
rehabilitation facility. 3 
Over the next several years, as she failed to regain her mental fac-
* Henry W. Bruce University Professor of Law and Medicine and Co-Director, Pacific 
Center for Health Policy and Ethics, University of Southern California. B.A. 1966, Swarthmore; 
LL.B. 1969, Yale; M.A. 1975, University of Pennsylvania. - Ed. 
1. Professor of Law, New York University; University Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford 
University. 
2. As some participants in these debates will take exception to Dworkin's definitions of these 
terms, it is important to keep in mind how he uses them: "Abortion, which means deliberately 
killing a developing human embryo, and euthanasia, which means deliberately killing a person 
out of kindness, are both choices for death. The first chooses death before life in earnest has 
begun, the second after it has ended." P. 3. Some proponents of the right to abortion emphasize 
that abortion "means" the termination of preguancy and the avoidance of parenthood; if one 
could accomplish those goals without killing an embryo, Dworkin's definition would not apply. 
His definition, however, seems to convey adequately the common usage of the term. 
The same cannot be said for his definition of euthanasia, especially because his own use of the 
term makes clear that by "deliberately killing a person out of kindness" he intends to encomp!!Ss 
not only active euthanasia of the sort Janet Adkins achieved with Dr. Jack Kevorkian's assist-
ance but also the withdrawal of respirators or tubes providing hydration and nutrition and appar-
ently even the acceleration of death brought about by narcotics used to relieve severe pain. 
Although one could argue that all of these practices amount to "deliberate killing" in the sense of 
being done intentionally with a known likelihood of bringing about death, lumping all together 
under the heading "deliberate killing" is likely to confuse the issue - and possibly, to distort 
public policy formulation - whatever one may say for its logical consistency. Furthermore, to 
say that euthanasia involves causing death "after [life] has ended" either takes a very strong 
position on the "quality of life" issue - equating a range of impairments with nonlife - or 
draws a line that would exclude from the purview of euthanasia several conditions - such as 
AIDS and cancer- that many cite as strong cases for voluntary, active euthanasia or "physician 
assistance in dying." 
3. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988), ajfd. sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, 
Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
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ulties and slid into what physicians call a persistent vegetative state, 
her parents slowly and reluctantly concluded that she would not have 
wished to be sustained in her condition by feeding tubes or other medi-
cal intervention. When hospital officials rejected their request to with-
draw treatment, her parents sought - and a court awarded - formal 
guardianship with authority to order termination of all life support. 4 
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial judge's order on the 
ground that the state's "interest in preservation of life" overrode any 
interest that Ms. Cruzan might have in being free of such death-delay-
ing interventions. The state's interest, held the court, "embraces two 
separate concerns: an interest in the prolongation of the life of the 
individual patient and an interest in the sanctity of life itself. "5 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri ruling, holding that 
a state does not violate the Due Process Clause when it refuses to 
allow the forgoing of a patient's life support, absent clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the patient had expressed such a wish while still 
competent. 6 The Court also reasoned that the state's interest in pro-
tecting human life was sufficiently strong to outweigh a guardian's 
conclusion that further treatment is not in the patient's best interest. 7 
The notion that the state has an interest in the "preservation of human 
life" independent of the patient's own interests drew stinging dissents 
from Justices Brennan and Stevens: 
[T]he State has no legitimate general interest in someone's life, com-
pletely abstracted from the interest of the person living that life, that 
could outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical treatment. 8 
4. 760 S.W.2d at 411-12. 
5. 760 S.W.2d at 419. 
6. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990). 
7. 
Missouri relies on its interest in the protection and preservation of human life, and there can 
be no gainsaying this interest. As a general matter, the States - indeed, all civilized nations 
- demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious crime .••• 
• • • Finally, we think a State may properly decline to make judgments about the "qual-
ity" of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest 
in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected inter· 
ests of the individual. 
497 U.S. at 280, 282. 
8. 497 U.S. at 313 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). Dis-
agreeing with the evidentiary standard as adopted and applied in the case, Justice Brennan ad-
dressed the claim that the state was justified in its allocation of the "risk of error" in a way that 
favored "the status quo": 
An erroneous decision [that is, one that did not reflect the patient's true wishes] to terminate 
artificial nutrition and hydration, to be sure, will lead to failure of that last remnant of 
physiological life, the brain stem, and result in complete brain death. An erroneous decision 
not to terminate life support, however, robs a patient of the very qualities protected by the 
right to avoid unwanted medical treatment. His own degraded existence is perpetuated; his 
family's suffering is protracted; the memory he leaves behind becomes more and more dis-
torted. 
Even a later decision to grant him his wish cannot undo the intervening harm. 
497 U.S. at 320. 
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However commendable may be the State's interest in human life, it can-
not pursue that interest by appropriating Nancy Cruzan's life as a sym-
bol for its own purposes. Lives do not exist in abstraction from persons, 
and to pretend otherwise is not to honor but to desecrate the State's 
responsibility for protecting life. 9 
Given the degree to which the dispute in Cruzan involved the sa-
cred value of human life, one is not immediately encouraged to find 
that this concept is central to Life's Dominion, in which Dworkin pro-
poses to offer an escape from the overheated rhetoric of the abortion 
and euthanasia debates. At first, Dworkin's alternative analysis - re-
placing a debate over rights and interests with a discussion of the in-
trinsic value of life - seems merely to shift the terms of engagement 
without ending the war. Indeed, it is hard to believe that Dworkin 
seriously thought that his alternative would produce a new era of calm 
analysis and rational disagreement. Yet, however much Life's Domin-
ion makes him seem like the Don Quixote of public policy, he has once 
again written an interesting book that is well worth reading for its 
arguments and insights about the importance of returning to the moral 
question - "What is life's intrinsic value?" - if not for the armistice 
it attempts to impose on the right-to-life/quality-of-life wars.10 
I. ABORTION AND THE SACRED VALUE OF LIFE 
Most of Life's Dominion is concerned with abortion, first in philo-
sophical and then in constitutional law terms. Dworkin begins by 
demonstrating that even those who speak in right-to-life language -
such as President Bush and Vice-President Quayle during the 1992 
campaign - do not actually believe that a fertilized egg from the mo-
ment of conception is a person whose abortion would always be mur-
der. As the polls show, most people would allow abortion in the case 
of rape or incest or severe fetal abnormalities; 11 this demonstrates that 
however much they value a fetus, they do not regard it as a child or 
other person. As Dworkin points out, even the Catholic Church has 
not always held its present position (p. 39). Moreover, the Catholic 
position is at odds with the writings of theologians such as Thomas 
9. 497 U.S. at 356-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
10. I note, but leave for the reader to evaluate, Dworkin's claim that his position will be more 
likely to improve "the quality of public political argument" than the theories put forward by 
others because he connects theory and practice "from the inside out" - that is, by beginning 
with the practical problems of abortion and euthanasia and then asking "which general philo-
sophical or theoretical issues we must confront in order to resolve those practical problems." Pp. 
28-29. If Dworkin intends more than practical reasoning and induction, and if his metaphor that 
in reasoning from the inside out "theories are bespoke, made for the occasion, Savile Row not 
Seventh Avenue" (p. 29) describes his method more than simply his taste in clothes, then one 
may well doubt that others should give much credence to theories that are so individually tai-
lored. Does that mean that these theories need not be consistently applied to other settings or 
meet other tests of integrity? See infra note 20. 
11. 82% OK Abortion Under Some Circumstances, USA Today/CNN/Gallup, June 30, 
1992, available in LEXIS, News library, Curnws file. 
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Aquinas, who grounded his theory of ensoulment on the Aristotelian 
notion of hylomorphism, or the idea that the human soul only exists in 
an identifiably human body, which by our present understanding 
would be one with a functioning neocortex - the organ required for 
spiritual activity, among other forms of conscious reflection, not func-
tional until late in gestation (pp. 40-42). 
Thus, Dworkin argues that the opponents of abortion have misde-
scribed the moral claim on which their opposition rests. He labels the 
conventional view the derivative objection to abortion "because it pre-
supposes and is derived from rights and interests that it assumes all 
human beings, including fetuses, have" (p. 11). He believes, however, 
that the antiabortion position is better understood as being detached 
from any presupposed rights or interests and as resting instead on the 
claim 
that human life has an intrinsic, innate value; that human life is sacred 
just in itself; and that the sacred nature of a human life begins when its 
biological life begins, even before the creature whose life it is has move-
ment or sensation or interests or rights of its own. [p. 11] 
Unlike the derivative view, framed in terms of rights and interests, the 
detached view leads not to conclusions about the claims that people 
can make on others for action or forbearance but instead to more im-
personal conclusions about whether a particular action would fail to 
respect - or would "disregard and insult," as Dworkin puts it (p. 11) 
- the intrinsic value of an entity.12 
If conservatives have it wrong when they claim that abortion is 
immoral because it violates the fetus's "right to life," liberals also have 
it wrong in suggesting that all that is at issue is a woman's right to 
control her body. Again, Dworkin suggests that once we set aside 
political rhetoric, we will see that feminists do not view abortion sim-
ply in terms of women's rights (pp. 50-60). To illustrate his thesis, he 
examines the positions of leading feminists and finds ways in which 
their views are - or can be made to be - consistent with his thesis 
that the fetus is something of intrinsic importance, albeit not a rights-
bearer. 
For example, Catharine MacKinnon rejects Roe v. Wade's right-
to-privacy theory partly because it links pregnancy to other situations 
in which the more powerful one of two connected entities asserts a 
sovereign right to end the connection.13 Instead, MacKinnon articu-
12. Living human beings are not the only entities of value: 
A beautiful sculpture can be smashed, and that would be a terrible insult to the intrinsic 
value that great works of art embody and also very much against the interests of people who 
take pleasure in seeing or studying them. But a sculpture has no interests of its own; a 
savage act of vandalism is not unfair to it. 
Pp. 15-16. 
13. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 
1311-20 (1991). 
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lates the pregnant woman's perspective that the fetus "is both me and 
not me. It 'is' the pregnant woman in the sense that it is in her and of 
her and is hers more than anyone's. It 'is not' her in the sense that she 
is not all that is there."14 MacK.innon further contends that until 
men's sexual domination of women is replaced with true equality, fe-
tuses must have lower status than women. 15 MacK.innon frames that 
view, Dworkin argues, in terms of the fetus-as-person debate, but re-
cast in light of his detached view of the fetus, it leads to the "arrest-
ing" conclusion "that the intrinsic importance of a new human life 
may well depend on the meaning and freedom of the act that created 
it" (p. 56). 
Similarly, in the theories of another legal scholar, Robin West, 
Dworkin finds further affirmation for his contention that feminists 
support abortion, not as a manifestation of "a right to be left alone but 
often to strengthen their ties to others."16 Abortion thus involves a 
conflict among responsibilities, including acting responsibly toward 
the future child - not the existing fetus. A person thinking in these 
terms is not thinking of competing rights but of relationships among 
entities, each of whom has intrinsic value. 
All of this seems sound and even helpful, at least analytically, al-
beit less novel than Dworkin makes it out to be.17 As Daniel Callahan 
pointed out several years ago, the continuing battle over Roe has 
meant that both sides have felt the need to harden their positions. As 
a result, they have failed to confront the moral issues of abortion in the 
way that we ought to address such important aspects of our lives. 18 
The proponents of women's choice feel particularly vulnerable; any 
admission that it is not always right to do what they say women have a 
right to do may appear to be an open invitation to opponents to re-
strict or revoke the right itself. 
Yet, while Dworkin seems correct that neither side in the prolife-
prochoice conflict really holds a pure "rights" perspective, it seems 
naive to the point of disingenuousness to suggest that both positions 
14. Id. at 1316 (footnote omitted). 
15. Id. at 1317. 
16. Robin West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Tenn - Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 84-85 (1990) (footnote omitted). 
17. Life's Dominion's 17 pages of footnotes (pp. 243-59) reveal that Dworkin has relied on a 
good deal of discussion in the academic legal literature as well as the popular media but show less 
familiarity with the discussion of the issues by lawyers, philosophers, and biomedical scientists in 
the bioethics literature, aside from chapter 8 (pp. 218-43), which apparently grew out of a paper 
that he wrote for a project on Alzheimer's disease for the Congressional Office of Technology 
Assessment. P. 222 n.12; see Ronald Dworkin, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Philosophical Issues Concerning the Rights of Patients Suffering Serious Permanent Dementia 
(1987), microfonned on Philosophical, Legal, and Social Aspects of Surrogate Decisionmaking 
for Elderly Individuals, CIS No. OTAJ952-30 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
18. See Daniel Callahan, An Ethical Challenge to Prochoice Advocates: Abortion & the Plu-
ralistic Proprosition, 117 CoMMONWEAL 681 (1990). 
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rest on the notion of the sacredness of life. In political - as opposed 
to moral or existential - terms, the net effect of Dworkin's clever 
argument is just to shift the terms of debate. No longer is the issue "Is 
the fetus a person, possessed of a right to life?" Instead, the question 
becomes "Does the sanctity of all human life stand in the way of 
abortion?" 
One might think that proponents of choice would be most worried 
by this way of framing the issue. As the dissenting Justices in the 
Cruzan case make clear in their anger with the majority's reasoning, 19 
invocations of the sacredness of human life readily lead to limitations 
on individual choice in the name of the state's obligation to protect 
and preserve human life. Yet they need not fear, for in Dworkin's 
hands the result is to limit severely how far the state can go in enforc-
ing any particular view of the sacredness of life. 20 
II. ABORTION AND THE LAW 
To translate respect for the intrinsic value of human life into law, 
Dworkin would permit states to take action geared toward maintain-
ing "a moral environment in which decisions about life and death are 
taken seriously and treated as matters of moral gravity" (p. 168). Ex-
actly how each individual actually weighs the sacredness of life in 
making decisions about such matters as abortion and euthanasia 
would, however, be beyond the reach of state regulation. 
Dworkin believes that any imposition of an officially promulgated 
position on issues about the meaning of life is not only tyrannical but 
destructive of individual moral responsibility. Yet the community has 
in the past taken upon itself the enforcement of a single set of views. 
Although it is doubtful that most Americans would be comfortable 
allowing the government to treat as heresy views with which the ma-
jority disagrees, it is less obvious that a majority would reject some 
limitations on conduct that directly threatens human life. For exam-
ple, as the Chief Justice noted in Cruzan, civilized societies everywhere 
19. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. 
20. In reaching this conclusion, Dworkin first argues that Justice Blackmun basically got 
things right in Roe v. Wade insofar as the question at issue involves the "derivative" view that the 
fetus is endowed with the rights of a person. Pp. 104-11. Next, he takes on the conservative 
constitutional scholars who challenge the right to privacy as a judicial invention. In the process 
of arguing for a "constitution of principle" rather than the "constitution of detail" that he attrib· 
utes to Justice Scalia and other conservative jurists, Dworkin subjects "enumerated rights" and 
"original intent" theories to withering critiques. Pp. 129-44. He ends - as readers of his 1986 
book, Law's Empire, might anticipate - with the plea that the public dismiss further arguments 
framed in these terms about the suitability of judicial nominees or the soundness of judicial 
opinions and instead "seek genuine constraints [on judicial power] in the only place where they 
can be found: in good argument." ·p. 145. The fact that there is no universally accepted metric 
for identifying bad judicial decisions ought not to lead us to the critical conclusion that legal 
reasoning is a waste of time, because we can at least insist that judges "accept an independent 
and superior constraint of integrity in the decisions they make." P. 146. 
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treat murder as a serious offense.21 As Justice Scalia added in his con-
currence, both the common law and the statutory law in this country 
have treated suicide as a crime - although it no longer is - and even 
private citizens' use of force to prevent suicide is privileged. 22 
Thus, Dworkin faces at least two tasks: (i) to show that in further-
ing respect for the sanctity of life, the Constitution forbids states from 
outlawing the ending of the life of a human being - such as a fetus -
who does not possess the full rights and interests of a person; and (ii) 
to convince those who now take a prolife view that, having accepted 
his reanalysis of their underlying premise - from right-to-life to sa-
credness-of-life - they must limit themselves to preachment and in 
the end must respect the choices made by people who understand very 
differently the limitations on human choices that are inherent in life's 
sacredness. He is more successful at the first than the second task, 
despite his optimism that reframing our political and constitutional 
debates in terms of sanctity of life not only better explains what is at 
stake but also allows for a greater degree of agreement. 
To address the first task, Dworkin directs our attention not to the 
right to privacy but to the First Amendment's guarantees of religious 
liberty, which he sees as necessarily protecting "procreative auton-
omy" (p. 166). The Constitution does not protect all claims to free 
choice in the face of state regulations and restrictions, even when they 
involve things of great importance to people. However, some matters 
- such as reproduction - are so foundational and our conceptions of 
them are so vulnerable to the intrusive effects of state regulation that 
Dworkin argues they must be protected against the imposition by the 
state of a single view of life's intrinsic value. To do otherwise, he 
claims, would restrict what are essentially religious beliefs - recogniz-
ing that not all people would so identify this category of beliefs in their 
own systems of morality.23 
One problem for Dworkin's conception is to explain how we can 
distinguish the "existential question - does human life have any in-
trinsic or objective importance?" - from "more secular convictions 
about morality, fairness, and justice" (p. 156). One way to derive the 
answer is to reason backwards: if an essential responsibility of govern-
ment is to decide how to reconcile our competing rights, then this 
21. See supra note 7. 
22. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 298 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
23. As he notes later, his views on religious liberty are very close in substance to those ex-
pressed by the three "center" Justices in Casey. Pp. 171-76. The latter rested their opinion on 
the Due Process Clause instead, but like Dworkin they concluded that "[a]t the heart ofliberty is 
the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were 
they formed under the compulsion of the State." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992). 
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must be a secular function, and the guarantees of religious liberty must 
not limit the state in exercising it. Conversely, there is no need for the 
state to take positions on the meaning of life; these matters are left to 
individual convictions under the First Amendment. 
If Dworkin is correct, however, in concluding that questions that 
turn on the value of life are essentially religious because they rest on 
underlying beliefs about the normative value of the beings that em-
body life - as endowed by the Creator, or as a result of a natural 
order, or whatever - and if he is correct that decisions closely tied to 
religious matters of this sort are protected against state dictates, he is 
then left with several problems. First, the question of regulation and 
prohibition: May the state regulate abortion - for example, effec-
tively prohibiting it late in pregnancy? Second, the question of educa-
tion and advocacy: Should the state be permitted to attempt to 
influence women to choose not to abort? 
To the former question Dworkin replies that a state can justify 
limitations on abortion after viability because the insult to the sanctity 
of life increases as the fetus develops and because most women know 
about their pregnancies from an early point, so that a woman waiting 
until late in term to abort demonstrates an indifference to the cultural 
sense of the greater wrong in destroying a more developed fetus - an 
indifference against which society has a right to protect itself. Fur-
thermore, around the time of viability the brain of the fetus is suffi-
ciently developed that the fetus, though not a person in the 
constitutional sense, "might then sensibly be said to have interests of 
its own" (p. 169). The state may protect those interests so long as it 
does so in a way that respects the rights of constitutional persons (p. 
169). 
As to the second question, Dworkin is comfortable with the line 
set out in Casey, that is, that the state may be an advocate for fetal life 
provided that in doing so it does not create an "undue burden" by 
posing "substantial obstacles" to the choice.24 Of course, reasonable 
people will disagree about when the state reaches the point of "undue 
burden," but interventions aimed at promoting thoughtful deliberation 
- as opposed to those that merely inconvenience or obstruct a wo-
man's choice - may well be consistent with respect for women as 
individual judges of life's value, each by her own lights. Surely, how-
ever, even if the state were to limit itself to urging women to appreci-
ate the gravity of their decisions, some people would be as offended by 
this official preachment as they would be by the "establishment" of 
any other view that they would regard as essentially religious - as, in 
effect, Dworkin has admitted all views about the sanctity or intrinsic 
value of life to be. By this point, Dworkin is skating along at an 
24. 112 S. Ct. at 2820. 
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Olympic clip, but the ice supporting him seems to have become aw-
fully thin. 
III. EUTHANASIA 
In the nearly twenty years since the New Jersey Supreme Court 
handed down its landmark decision in In re Quinlan, 25 courts have 
widely adopted the view that competent patients have the right to re-
fuse any medical care, including life-sustaining interventions such as 
respirators and feeding tubes.26 In Cruzan a majority of the Justices 
recognized that the Constitution guaranteed such a liberty interest to 
each person.27 Further, under the common law and under statutes 
adopted in most states, a person while competent may prepare an "ad-
vance directive,, that either gives instructions about the extent of life 
support she wants under specified circumstances - such as "a termi-
nal condition" - or names an agent who is authorized to make treat-
ment decisions if the patient becomes unable to do so, or both. 28 
Finally, most but not all jurisdictions allow a court-appointed guard-
ian or an incompetent patient's family or close friends to make treat-
ment decisions in the absence of an advance directive or comparable 
oral instructions. Such a decision by a "surrogate" may be either a 
"substitute judgment," based fairly closely on the known values and 
preferences of the patient, or, in the absence of sufficient information, 
a determination of what the surrogate believes would be in the "best 
interests,, of the patient, given his or her prospects for survival, im-
provement, and recovery and the burden that the process would im-
pose - in terms of dignity as well as financial cost and physical pain 
- on the patient. 29 
To these two hallmarks of the end-of-life cases that are personal to 
the patient - autonomy and best interests - Dworkin adds a third, 
impersonal factor: the sacred value of life (p. 194). As noted at the 
outset, 30 for some people the clear implication of this value is that it is 
permissible for the state to insist on prolonging a patient's physical 
25. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
26. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271-77 (1990) (citing 
cases supporting the right to refuse medical care). 
27. 497 U.S. at 278-79. 
28. See, e.g., COORDINATING CoUNCIL ON LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT DECI-
SION MAKING BY THE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN LIFE-
SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES app. E (2d ed. 1993) (listing and analyzing state 
statutes). 
29. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App.), cert denied, 
488 U.S. 958 (1988); Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983); In re Guardi-
anship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Blud-
worth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 
1986); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. dem"ed, 
429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
30. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
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existence even when it might not be in that patient's best interests. 
The Court in Cruzan upheld a state's authority to do so, in the absence 
of clear and convincing evidence that the patient would have wanted 
treatment to cease under the circumstances.31 As we have seen in 
Dworkin's use of the idea of the sacred value of life in the abortion 
context, however, Life's Dominion does not support such a simplistic 
use of the notion that life has intrinsic worth. Indeed, in his final two 
chapters Dworkin's major objective seems to be linking the concept of 
the sanctity of life that he developed in the abortion context to the 
existing decisional tools - autonomy and best interests. 32 
The analysis in these chapters on critically ill and demented pa-
tients is serviceable, albeit much less novel than the earlier material. 
Many thoughtful writers have in recent years addressed the problems 
of decisionmaking by and for dying, demented, and comatose patients 
- when, for example, the present "best interests" of a patient ought to 
override his or her "autonomous" wishes, whether currently or previ-
ously expressed, or to what extent physicians have an obligation to 
provide or withhold care when doing so conflicts with their profes-
sional or personal values. 33 Dworkin would have greatly enriched the 
discussion had he grappled with contemporary thinking about the 
place of health and pain in human life and the roles of physicians and 
others in health care. His philosophical musings on the role played by 
surrogates - especially when they claim to be able to make a substi-
tuted judgment based on what they think an incompetent patient 
would choose - take no account of studies that suggest that surro-
gates - and physicians - do not do a very accurate job of making 
such predictions. 34 
Life's Dominion delves less deeply into euthanasia than abortion; 
Dworkin is content to set forth a philosophical analysis in this area 
without exploring its legislative or constitutional details. "None of us 
wants to end our lives out of character," he concludes (p. 213). Thus, 
in assessing a person's autonomous choices or in calculating his best 
31. Cruzan, 491 U.S. at 285 (1990). 
32. In his final chapter, "Life Past Reason," in which Dworkin deals with decisionmaking 
for and about demented patients with special reference to Alzheimer's Disease, he shifts to using 
the terms autonomy, beneficence, and dignity. Pp. 218-41. The discussion is a useful elaboration 
on the earlier examination of these issues and their relationship to the sanctity of life, but the 
chapter is the least well integrated into the central thesis of the rest of the book. 
33. See, e.g., DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE (1993); DANIEL CAL· 
LAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS (1990); ERIC J. CASSELL, 
THE NATURE OF SUFFERING AND THE GOALS OF MEDICINE (1991); LEON R. KAss, TOWARD 
A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS (1985). 
34. Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Understanding of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation Preferences 
by Physicians and Nurses, 150 W.J. MED. 705 (1989): Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians' and 
Spouses' Predictions of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY Ml 15 
(1988); Nancy R. Zweibel & Christine K. Cassel, Treatment Choices at the End of Life: A Com-
parison of Decisions by Older Patients and Their Physician-selected Proxies, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 
615 (1989). 
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interests, society should recognize that the sanctity of human life 
means more than its mere biological continuation - what Dworkin 
terms "the natural investment" (p. 214). Sanctity also means the 
human investment, what an individual regards as his critical interests, 
or those things that make up a good life - and hence also a good 
death. This is a more eloquent and fully elaborated version of the 
views expressed by Justices Brennan and Stevens in their dissents in 
Cruzan. 35 
Because Dworkin eschews wrestling with the "difficult and impor-
tant administrative questions" (p. 216), he does not get beyond show-
ing that the Chief Justice's opinion failed to distinguish clearly the 
distinct values of autonomy, best interests, and sanctity of life and, by 
implication, badly misunderstood the last of these. It is thus opaque 
whether Dworkin intends his bold conclusion - that respect for the 
sanctity of life counsels in favor of active euthanasia and assisted sui-
cide in certain cases - to lend support to efforts to legalize physician 
participation in these practices or merely to be a philosophical argu-
ment. This seems to me regrettable, as some of the most telling argu-
ments against legalization come from commentators such as Yale 
Kamisar who weigh concerns other than those that Dworkin termed 
religious in his analysis of abortion. 36 My own sense is that the risks 
to the very values Dworkin identifies with the human investment in 
life are such that society may forbid certain forms of killing, especially 
by medical personnel, even when carried out at the request of, or to 
further the best interests of, seriously ill patients, and that doing so 
does not amount to the "devastating, odious form of tyranny" (p. 217) 
that Dworkin correctly implies would offend any civilized society, es-
pecially one with a formal bill of rights such as ours. 
IV. THE VALUE OF LIFE 
Dworkin's treatment of the issues at the end of life is briefer, I 
suppose, because it is less difficult to convince people of his central 
claim, that is, that the value or worth of human life comes not from 
mere biological functioning but from how the person living it con-
ceives of his critical interests and lives his life to manifest and achieve 
those interests. Although Dworkin argues for what he terms the de-
tached view of the intrinsic value of life, in the case of a patient who is 
or once was a competent adult - or perhaps even a child of an age of 
reason - this detached view usually coincides with the derivative 
view, namely that value flows from respect for the individual's rights 
and interests. 
When discussing abortion, in contrast, Life's Dominion faces a 
35. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. 
36. Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed ''Mercy-killing" Legislation, 
42 MINN. L. REv. 969 (1958). 
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harder challenge because the intrinsic value of life is more dependent 
on the natural investment in that life, the human dimension being still 
absent. It is thus a mark of the book's success on an analytic level that 
it builds such a strong and relatively novel claim for the effect of the 
sanctity of life on abortion law and practice. Yet, at the same time, 
the very effectiveness of Dworkin's argument probably makes futile his 
professed ambition to bring prolife advocates to the table with their 
prochoice counterparts for a harmonious discussion carried out with 
common terminology. Nonetheless, any reminder of the human 
meaning of our precious lives and any encouragement to reflect on 
how one should go about living well that is as lucid as Life's Dominion 
deserves our applause. 
